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How in the space of some 300 years did the leading edge in global economic and military power 
pass from „East‟ to „West‟? How was this process bound up in the breakthrough to capitalist 
modernity in Western Europe and its ascendency to global domination? However formulated, 
the question of how „the West‟ came to rule has been at the forefront of social scientific debates 
since its inception. Whether focusing on Europe‟s unique cultural and institutional inheritance, 
its distinctively „restless rationalism‟, and/or its advantageous ecological system, traditional 
explanations of Europe‟s rise locate its origins as immanent to Europe itself.1  
The „European miracle‟ is conceived as one of self-generation emerging from the unique 
if not peculiar attributes of a singular European developmental experience. „The “miracle” of 
massive economic development‟, Michael Mann writes, „occurred “spontaneously” in Europe, 
and nowhere else‟.2 Similarly, Ricardo Duchesne insists on the „uniqueness of the West‟ 
emphasizing its „higher intellectual and artistic creativity‟ and „exceptional‟ development of 
reason, and freedom.3 Accordingly, from such perspectives, there was – and perhaps still is – 
something inherently exceptional about „the West‟ that distinguished it from „the rest‟. 
Such self-aggrandizing narratives of Western „exceptionalism‟ have come under criticism 
from an array of scholars in different fields.4 While diverging in their analyses and conclusions, 
                                                          
1 See, inter alia, Daniel Chirot, “The Rise of the West”, American Sociological Review, 50,2 (1985):181-195; Michael 
Mann, The Sources of Social Power: A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760, Vol. I (Cambridge:Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), Chapters 12-15; David Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Are Some So Rich and 
Others So Poor? (New York:W.W. Norton, 1998); Eric Jones, The European Miracle: Environments, Economies and 
Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2003); Niall Ferguson, Civilization: 
The West and the Rest (London:Penguin, 2011).  
2 Michael Mann, “European Development: Approaching a Historical Explanation”, in Jean Baechler, John A. Hall, 
and Michael Mann, eds., Europe and the Rise of Capitalism (Oxford:Basil Blackwell, 1989), 6-19, 6. 
3 Ricardo Duchesne, The Uniqueness of Western Civilization (Leiden:Brill, 2011), 236, 237-238.  
4 See, among others, A.G. Frank, ReORIENT: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley:University of California 
Press, 1998); Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World Economy 
(Princeton:Princeton University Press, 2000); John M. Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation 
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they share a common theme of problematizing the notion of a uniquely self-propelling „rise of 
the West‟. They have instead focused on the conjunctural, „accidental‟, and sometimes downright 
lucky factors that they argue explains Europe‟s rise. They have also highlighted the intersocietal 
conditions shaping Europe‟s trajectory to global dominance. These revisionist perspectives 
provide a significant challenge to Eurocentric narratives by arguing that there was nothing unique 
or endogenous about Europe‟s development that led them to global supremacy.  
Despite some affinities, this article challenges the revisionists‟ conjunctural explanation of 
Europe‟s late breakthrough and their tendency to deny substantive developmental differences 
between „West‟ and „East‟ and within Europe itself. After demonstrating the myriad difficulties 
the revisionists‟ run into in theoretically explaining the „rise of the West‟ in Section I, we then 
provide an alternative explanation drawing on and further refining the theory of uneven and 
combined development (U&CD). Such a perspective assists in redressing shortcomings found on 
the two sides of the debate: namely, the traditional Eurocentric approaches focus on the 
immanent (sui generis yet structural) characteristics of European development; and, the 
revisionists‟ emphasis on the developmental homogeneity of Eurasian societies (the flattening of 
substantive societal differences) and role of contingencies in explaining Europe‟s ascent. The 
theory of U&CD resolves these problems by integrating structural and contingent factors into a 
unified explanation: unevenness makes sense of the sociological differences that the revisionists 
miss, while combination captures the aleatory processes of interactive development overlooked 
by Eurocentric approaches. In Section II, we examine the structural specificities of European and 
Asian societies‟ development over the longue durée along with the sociologically generative 
interactions between them reconceptualized through the perspective of U&CD thereby allowing 
for the incorporation of ostensibly contingent, „external‟ factors into the realm of theory.5   
This sets up the conjunctural analysis offered in Section III, where we explore the 
multifaceted interaction of „internal‟ and „external‟ processes leading to the fall of the Mughal 
Empire and its colonization by the British. Here we argue that Britain‟s transformation from a 
capitalist to industrial capitalist society was appreciably assisted through the colonization of India. 
Not only did the exploitation of Indian raw materials and the stronghold over their markets 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2004); Jack Goody, Capitalism and Modernity: The Great Debate 
(Cambridge:Polity, 2004); Jack A. Goldstone, Why Europe? The Rise of the West in World History, 1500-1850 (New 
York:McGraw-Hill, 2009). 
5 Luke Cooper, “Can Contingency be „Internalised‟ into the Bounds of Theory?”, Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs 26,3 (2013):573-597. 
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provide invaluable inputs to „kick-start‟ Britain‟s industrialization process, but the capturing of 
the Indian landmass afforded the British Empire with crucial strategic advantages. In addition to 
occupying a territorialized dominion at the very heart of Asia, Britain obtained a substantial and 
relatively cheap military force, which it utilized to open up other markets throughout the world 
further aiding Britain‟s industrialization. Britain‟s colonization of India was therefore a critical 
conjunctural factor explaining Britain‟s – and later Europe‟s – usurping of „the rest‟.  
 
Rethinking the ‘Rise of the West’: Advances and Impasses in the Revisionist Challenge  
 
Late and Lucky: Contingences, the Eurasian Homogeneity Thesis, and the Great Divergence 
 
In numerous revisionist works there has been an emphasis on the overall homogeneity of „Eurasian 
development‟.6 This stems from the revisionist attempts to demonstrate the fallacy of traditional 
accounts of the „rise of the West‟ conceived in terms of a rigid East-West binary: that is, Europe 
and Asia‟s developmental paths strikingly diverged over the longue durée due to internal attributes 
of their respective social structures. Summarizing the key findings of the revisionist school Jack 
Goldstone writes that 
 
(1) most conditions in Europe do not seem broadly different from those in the advanced regions of 
Asia until relatively recently, c. 1800; and (2) the later great divergence need not be rooted in great and 
long-standing prior differences, but could well be the result of small differences and chance events 
that created oddly exceptional political and cultural conditions not in „Europe‟ but in small parts of 
Europe and, much later, in Japan.7 
 
In correctly attempting to problematize Eurocentric claims regarding the uniqueness of the 
European experience, revisionists nonetheless  erase important differences between European 
and non-Western social structures when explaining the advent of capitalism, modernity and 
industrialization. Jack Goody, for example, cautions „against drawing too sharp a contrast 
between East and West in those features of social organization that could relate to the onset of 
capitalism, modernization and industrialization‟ since „economically the distinct qualitative 
                                                          
6 There are exceptions, notably, Hobson, Easter Origins, 192; Frank, ReOrient, 324. 
7 Jack Goldstone, „„The Rise of the West-Or Not?”, Sociological Theory, 18,2 (2000):175-194, 191. 
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difference between East and West came only with industrialization‟.8 Similarly, Kenneth 
Pomeranz writes of the „variety of early modern core regions with roughly comparable levels and 
trends of development in their everyday economies‟ .9 More radically still, Goldstone claims that 
 
From 1500–1800 the major states of Europe, China, India, and the Ottoman Empire were all 
experiencing a similar course of advanced organic development, with absolutist bureaucratic states, 
highly productive agriculture, a sophisticated urban culture, and extensive long-distance trade in both 
luxuries and daily necessities… in all of them, the material standard of living c. 1800 was no greater 
than it had been c. 1500.10 
  
As laudable as such attempts are downplaying any narrative of European „exceptionality‟, the 
theoretical drawbacks are immense, to say nothing of the empirical difficulties of sustaining such 
arguments.11 By flattening the myriad social structures making up the early modern world, it 
becomes very difficult – if not impossible – to explain the striking divergences in their 
developmental trajectories.12 The point here is not to reinstate any „European exceptionalist‟ 
explanation, but rather highlight how the interactively-generated differences between Europe and 
other societies were key to „Western‟ ascendancy. As examined below, the very „backwardness‟ of 
feudal Europe facilitated the propitious conditions from which capitalism could emerge, while 
this process was structurally conditioned by Europe‟s near-constant interaction with more 
advanced non-Western agents.13  
With the initial breakthroughs to capitalism made in the Netherlands and England, this led 
to increasing material disparities – a widening of the competitive gulf – between these societies 
and others.14 Nonetheless, the advent of capitalism in Northwestern Europe did not immediately 
translate into the kind of hierarchical power relation that characterized the nineteenth century. 
While capitalism offered the productive potential for increased technological innovations 
                                                          
8 Goody, Capitalism and Modernity, 102, 60. 
9 Pomeranz, The Great Divergence, 111.  
10 Goldstone, „Capitalist Origins‟, 120.  
11 For critiques of the revisionists denial of socioeconomic differences in the early modern world, see Stephen 
Broadberry and Bishnupriya Gupta, “The Early Modern Great Divergence: Wages, Prices and Economic 
Development in Europe and Asia, 1500-1800”, Economic History Review, 59,1 (2006):2-31; Robert C. Allen et. al, 
“Wages, Prices, and Living Standards in China, 1738–1925: In Comparison with Europe, Japan, and India”, Economic 
History Review, 64,S1 (2011):8–38. 
12 Joseph M. Byrant, “The West and the Rest Revisited”, Canadian Journal of Sociology, 31,4 (2006):403-444, 418. 
13 For the details, see OMITTED. 
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(including, significantly, within the military sphere) and superior financial and organizational 
capacities, the developmental effects were not instant or undifferentiated, but staggered, uneven 
and interactively conditioned by opportunities and pressures emanating from non-Western 
sources (more below).  
An account of the origins of capitalism in Northwestern Europe is in itself not enough to 
explain the region‟s subsequent ascendancy.15 Rather, capitalism should be conceived as having 
provided the conditions of possibility for Europe to eventually overcome and dominate their Asian 
rivals. Bryant is then correct when writing that 
 
The protracted and forcible dominion of the West over the Rest…cannot logically be accounted for 
on the basis of fundamental similarities between conqueror and conquered, oppressor and oppressed, 
but must, in the very nature of so inequitable an outcome, register the relational consequences of 
differences and disparities…as these played out in a coercive contest for land, resources, mastery.16 
 
 Without recourse to some form of structural explanation of these diverging paths of 
development over the longue durée, the revisionists are left to account for the „rise of the West‟ in 
terms of pure contingencies and world-historical accidents. In the words of John M. Hobson: 
„…the rise of the West could indeed be explained almost wholly through contingency‟.17 
Goldstone in turn describes the conjunctural factors leading to Britain‟s transformation into a 
modern, industrialized state as the „most freakish of accidents‟.18 For Pomeranz, the contingent 
combination of coal and colonies provided Europe with the necessary resources to launch itself 
into self-sustaining economic growth thereby escaping the labour-intensive path of 
development.19 Consequently, „[i]n place of cumulative, path-dependent lines of causality and 
densely contextual interdependencies‟, Bryant notes, „the revisionist paradigm offers a more 
episodic and atomistic view of social change, wherein determinant efficacy is vested not with 
ongoing trajectories and systemic institutional configurations, but with the autonomous play of 
variables and the re-routings occasioned by extraneous contingencies‟.20  
                                                          
 
16 Bryant, “The West”, 434. 
17 Hobson, Eastern Origins, 313.  
18 Goldstone, “Rise of the West”, 187. 
19 Pomeranz, Great Divergence, 13. 
20 Bryant, “The West”, 435. 
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This is then a historical sociological approach that essentially erases the „historical‟ and 
„sociological‟ from the equation as sociohistorical developments are conceived in radically 
discontinuous terms and sharp breaks, whereby antecedent conditions from which developments 
usually enfold are entirely displaced. This is not to deny that contingent or fortuitous factors may 
have aided the process of „catch up‟ and „overtake‟ development that occurred in Northwestern 
Europe. Nonetheless, something deeper – more structural – was also clearly at work in these 
processes.  
While marking some important advances over conventional Eurocentric explanations of 
the „rise of the West‟, the revisionist challenge nonetheless fails to offer a viable alternative. It 
remains beset by the problems of analytical indeterminacies, empirical shortcomings, and a 
reliance on a purely conjunctural mode of explanation that foregoes a theorization of the 
sociohistorical processes at work for the play of free-floating contingencies. In the absence of 
any alternative theorization, the revisionist approach is unable to fully overturn the prevailing 
„rise of the West‟ paradigm. Hence, as Bryant concludes: „[w]e need neither a new sociology nor a 
new history; all that is required is a fully integrative and encompassing historical sociology‟.21 As 
we hope to demonstrate, this is what the theory of U&CD provides: a more integrative and 
encompassing international historical sociology.  
  
Uneven and Combined Development and ‘the ‘Rise of the West’ 
 
Recent years have witnessed unprecedented scholarly attention to Leon Trotsky‟s idea of U&CD 
as a potential resource in theorizing „the international‟ and, by extension, rethinking world 
history.22 For implicit in Trotsky‟s original formulation of U&CD was a reconceptualization of all 
development as interactive and multilinear, redefining the very concept and logic of development 
itself.23 Whereas the classical sociological tradition conceptualized society as a singular 
                                                          
21 Bryant, „New Sociology‟, 164-165. 
22 For a list of some of these contributions, see 
<http://www.unevenandcombineddevelopment.wordpress.com/writings/>. 
23 Leon Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution, 3 Vols. (Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press, 1959), esp. 
Chapter 1. Though it is often assumed that Trotsky employed U&CD exclusively to examine the „peculiarities‟ of 
Russian development in explaining the October Revolution, Trotsky clearly envisioned U&CD as being universally 
applicable in both time and space, writing for example that: „The law of uneven development is supplemented 
throughout the whole course of history by the law of combined development‟ (Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed, New 
York: Monod, 1937, 30). For reconstructions of U&CD as a „general abstraction‟ applicable to different historical 
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abstraction,24 Trotsky‟s conception of development was inscribed with a „more-than-one‟ 
ontological premise.25 So what exactly is the importance of U&CD for explaining the „rise of the 
West‟?  
The significance of the concept is primarily three-fold. First, the theory uniquely 
incorporates a distinctly intersocietal dimension of causality into its most basic conception of 
development as it reconceives the process as strategically interactive, co-constitutive and thus 
necessarily multilinear, the outcome of which is always the composite effect of a multiplicity of 
spatially diverse nonlinear causal chains that combine in any given conjuncture.26 Those aspects 
of world-historical development – alterity, mimesis, hybridity, translation, etc. – that revisionist 
and postcolonial scholars highlight are thus rendered theoretically explicable in substantive 
historical and sociological terms. Such developmental characteristics are thereby lifted from mere 
descriptive statements of otherwise arbitrary instantiations of societal differences into active 
causal factors explaining Western ascendancy. Second, by reformulating „the international‟ as an 
„object of social theory – organically contained… within a conception of social development 
itself‟27 – U&CD allows for the theoretical internalization of contingent, „external‟ factors and 
variegated developmental outcomes.  
Third, U&CD allows for a holistic account of the „rise of the West‟ and „decline of the 
East‟ as interconnected and mutually constitutive in a way that brings the role of „the 
international‟ to the forefront of social-theoretical explanation. This goes some way in breaking 
out of the analytical stalemate between „internalist‟ and „externalist‟ modes of explanations 
characterizing existing debates.28 The following offers a schematic exposition of the theory‟s two 
main concepts – unevenness and combination.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
eras and contexts, see Justin Rosenberg, Justin Rosenberg, “Why Is There No International Historical Sociology?”, 
European Journal of International Relations, 12,3 (2006):307-340; Kamran Matin, Recasting Iranian Modernity: International 
Relations and Social Change (London: Routledge, 2013); OMITTED. 
24 Rosenberg, „International Historical Sociology?‟. 
25 Justin Rosenberg, “The Philosophical Premises of Uneven and Combined Development”, Review of International 
Studies, 39,3 (2013):569-597, 581-83. 
26 Rosenberg, “International Historical Sociology?”.  
27 Rosenberg, “International Historical Sociology?”, 308.  
28 The revisionist historiographical approaches have largely fallen into the latter „externalist‟ mode of explanation, 
particularly those drawing on World-Systems Analyses exemplified in the works of Frank, ReOrient, Eric H. Mielants, 
The Origins of Capitalism and the ‘Rise of the West’ (Philadelphia:Temple University Press, 2007), Andre Gunder Frank 
and Barry K. Gills, eds., The World System: Five Hundred Years Or Five Thousand? (London:Routledge, 1993), but also 
including more „neo-Weberian‟ scholars such as John M. Hobson, Eastern Origins. Traditional explanations have, by 
contrast, largely operated with an „internalist‟ mode of analysis: see e.g., Duchesne, The Uniqueness; Landes, Wealth and 
Poverty of Nations; Ferguson, Civilization. While the likes of Michael Mann and Perry Anderson partly transgress the 
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Unevenness denotes developmental variations both within and between societies, along with 
the attendant spatial differentiations between them. The starting point for Trotsky was then an 
empirical observation about the basic ontology of human development: that a multiplicity of 
societies varying in size, culture, political organisation, and socioeconomic system is a general 
feature of human history – its „most general law‟.29 From this empirical observation, Trotsky was 
able to infer both the quantitative (multiple societies) and qualitative (different societies) 
unevenness of development.30 But rather than simply describing two static conditions of such 
development (multiplicity – difference), he sought to capture how their dialectical interaction 
formed the basic socio-relational texture of the historical process as a whole, wherein the shifting 
identity of any particular society accumulated and crystallized.31   
Developmentally differentiated societies are conceived as constantly impacting upon one 
another‟s development and reproduction instigating various forms of combined development. 
Thus while specific spatio-temporal patterns of socio-cultural diversity may be contingent, „the 
fact of this diversity itself is not‟.32 That is, when diverse and differentially situated societies 
interact – whether through cooperation, conflict or cross-cultural exchange – this „results in 
particular outcomes that cannot be anticipated in advance and are therefore “contingent”‟.33 This 
international dimension of development thus imbues the historical process with a highly 
unpredictable, contingent character generating widely diverse effects. As such, the dynamics and 
modalities of societal differences are not to be visualized as the result of pure essentialisms – an 
inherent property of a society‟s endogenous development – but rather „dependent on a whole 
web of “necessary but contingent” interactions‟.34 
The indeterminacy of such „contingent‟ outcomes can therefore be reconceptualized as 
an intrinsic property of development itself. U&CD thereby provides a theoretical means of 
explicating the differentiated forms of agency and outcomes emergent from these „necessary but 
contingent‟ intersocietal interactions contradicting any pre-determined, linear interpretation of 
sociohistorical causality and development. In these ways, „contingency‟ and „necessity‟ can be 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
divide between „internalist‟ and „externalist‟ poles, they do so only formally as neither substantively theorize „the 
international‟.  
29 Trotsky, History, 5.  
30 Rosenberg, “Uneven and Combined Development”, 576.  
31 Rosenberg, „International Historical Sociology?‟, 324.  
32 Rosenberg, “International Historical Sociology?”, 316. 
33 Cooper, “Bounds of Theory?”, 592. 
34 Cooper, “Bounds of Theory?”, 592.  
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brought into a more historically-sensitive theoretical framework that goes beyond contingent and 
structural-based explanations of the „rise of the West‟.  
Combination refers to the ways in which the internal relations of a society are determined 
by their relations with other developmentally differentiated societies. This results in the 
intermingling and fusion of the „foreign‟ and „native‟, „advanced‟ and „backward‟, within a social 
formation, whilst simultaneously ontologically blurring the analytical distinctions between such 
categories.35 As with unevenness, combination holds a strong empirical referent: multiple 
societies do not simply exist hermetically side-by-side, but interactively coexist, which by 
necessity (and with varying degree) determines their collective social and geopolitical 
development.36 For example, in Trotsky‟s History of the Russian Revolution, we find numerous 
processes through which the more „backward‟ Russia attempted to developmentally „catch up‟ 
with a more advanced Western Europe by making use of their pre-existing developmental 
achievements. The „privilege‟ of Russia‟s backwardness thereby entailed a „skipping‟ of stages, 
ensuring attempts at catch up did not follow the same paths of antecedent developments.37 In the 
context of debates on the „rise of the West‟, this is a particularly important point since up until 
the mid-thirteenth century, it was those social formations that would come to make up „Europe‟ 
that were the least developed in the emerging „world system‟ of increasing economic integration and 
cultural contacts between „East‟ and „West‟.38 
 Arising late on the periphery of this world system, European development had the most 
to gain from the new intersocietal links being forged, particularly through the diffusion of new 
technologies and „resource portfolios‟ spreading from „East‟ to „West‟. The principles of 
mathematics, navigational inventions, arts of war, and military technologies all originated in the 
more advanced „East‟ before passing to the „backward‟ West.39 This enabled European states to 
acquire the means to revolutionize their own societies in much more intensive concentrations of 
time than had the original purveyors. Later developing states did not need to start from scratch 
but could instead acquire and refine the most advanced technologies and organizational forms 
pioneered by earlier developers. In this respect, European societies benefitted from a „privilege of 
                                                          
35 Cf. Matin, Recasting Iranian Modernity.  
36 Rosenberg, „International Historical Sociology?‟, 319. 
37 Trotsky, History, 27, 476. 
38 Janet Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350 (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 
1989). 
39Hobson, Easter Origins; McNeil and McNeil, Human Web, 117–118; Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony, 112.  
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backwardness‟ which was a key precondition for the eventual emergence of capitalism within 
them and their subsequent global ascendency.  
By contrast, the earlier and more developed tributary Empires in Asia, enjoyed for a time 
certain „advantages of progressiveness‟. However, these advantages would eventually turn into 
strategic liabilities as less developed societies came to reap the „privilege of backwardness‟ 
concomitant to processes of developmental „catch-up‟. As Andre Gunder Frank writes,  
 
The common global economic expansion since 1400 benefited the Asian centers earlier and more than 
marginal Europe, Africa, and the Americas. However, this very economic benefit turned into a 
growing absolute and relative disadvantage for one Asian region after another in the late eighteenth 
century… Europe and then also North America …were able to take advantage of this pan-Asian crisis 





In this sense, the qualitative unevenness of development, exhibited by the asynchronic 
simultaneity of an interactive multiplicity of different societies, afforded late-comers particular 
strategic advantages. This was neither an automatic nor predestined process, but one where both 
conjunctural and structural factors and agency were key. In what follows, we historically unpack 
these structural and conjunctural combinations as key components in the „rise of the West‟. First 
we examine the structural condition of European feudal crisis before moving on to an 
exploration of the conjunctural specificity of British colonisation in India.  
 
Structure and Conjuncture in the ‘Rise of the West’ 
 
Feudalism, Merchants, and the States System in Europe 
 
Thus far we have been emphasizing the need to widen the analysis of the „rise of the West‟ to 
conditions and determinations emerging outside of Europe in order to dislodge the familiar 
Eurocentric claims of some innate European dynamism. There is, however, one specific 
structural attribute unique to late medieval and early modern European development that 
                                                          
40 Frank, ReOrient, 318, 324. 
This is the accepted version of Anievas, Alexander and Nişancioğlu ‘How Did the West Usurp the Rest? Origins of the 
Great Divergence over the Longue Durée’ Comparative Studies in Society and History Vol. 59 (1), 34-67. Published 
version available from Cambridge University Press at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417516000608  
Accepted Version downloaded from: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24382/  
  
requires further investigation as it does seem to provide some important clues into Europe‟s 
eventual attainment of a comparative advantage in the making of war and production: that is, the 
decentralized and politically fragmented nature of European feudal relations that gave rise to a 
fiercely competitive multi-state system. Indeed, the ferociously conflictual character of the 
European state system has often been cited as a crucial factor in the conventional literature on 
the „rise of the West‟, particularly among neo-Weberians holding to a „geopolitical competition 
model‟ of development.41  
The main problem with such accounts emphasizing interstate competition as the main 
driver of European developments is the implicit syllogism underlying the model‟s causal 
sequencing: „political multiplicity – anarchy – competition‟. In other words, the significant 
socioeconomic and political effects that the neo-Weberians derive from the persistent „whip‟ of 
geopolitical competition in spawning technological and organizational innovations in European 
state-building practices takes for granted precisely what needs to be explained: why was the 
European states system so competitive and war-prone? The neo-Weberians thereby smuggle in 
the highly problematic (neo-)realist assumption that any anarchic system of multiple political 
units will automatically induce geopolitical competition, rivalry, and war, which only works if „we 
assume the anthropologically questionable idea of man as a natural power-maximizer or a 
psychologizing rational-choice model, where risk minimization creates an inherent security 
dilemma‟.42  
Moreover, by emphasizing the essentially undifferentiated effects of military rivalry on 
European state formation processes there is a partial convergence between neo-Weberian 
historical sociology and neorealism over the role of geopolitical competition as a kind of 
Darwinian selection mechanism sorting out the weak from the strong.43 Yet European state 
responses to the universal problem of war facing them in the late medieval and early modern 
epochs were strikingly different.44 What we need then is a theory that organically combines both 
„sociological‟ and „geopolitical‟ factors in a unified conception of development. And, again, this is 
what the theory of U&CD offers as the historically-specific sources, dynamics, and scales of 
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42 Benno Teschke, The Myth of 1648 (London:Verso), 123.  
43 See e.g. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (London:McGraw Hill).  
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unevenness and combination must be grounded in historical social structures. What then explains 
the particularly war-prone nature of the European states system and were its effects beneficial to 
processes of state modernization, specifically in affording certain European states‟ with a 
comparative advantage in the means of violence?  
The answer lies in Europe‟s feudal relations of production. At first sight, this might seem 
like an illicit return to the kind of internalist Eurocentric theorizing we have been attempting to 
avoid. Yet, when widening the analysis beyond Europe, it is important to recognize that while 
feudal  relations– and the geopolitical system emerging therewith – were indeed unique to Europe 
their technological, military, and ideological components all bore distinctly intersocietal origins. 
Indeed, the rise of feudalism in Europe was the consequence of the „catastrophic collision of two 
dissolving anterior [ancient and primitive] modes of production‟: namely, the „decomposing slave 
mode of production‟ on which the Roman Empire had once been constructed, and the „deformed 
primitive modes of production of the Germanic invaders which survived in their new homelands‟ 
after the conquests.45 The developmental trajectory of Europe‟s Germanic forest „tribes‟ 
converged with the remnants of the ancient Roman Empire producing an entirely novel, 
synthesized form of sedentary society hitherto unknown in human history – feudalism. Moreover, 
the recombination of the „disintegrated elements‟ of these two anterior modes of production – 
the „Romano–Germanic synthesis‟46– into feudalism proper, was „itself a product of the constant 
and eventually unbearable pressure of the nomadic Huns on the Germanic world of the Teutonic 
tribes‟.47  
The genesis of feudalism in European was thus a consequence of these  nomadic-
sedentary interactions emanating from within and outside of Europe. Furthermore, the nomadic-
sedentary interactions generated by the Mongol Empire‟s expansion into Europe and the 
accompanying spread of the Black Death, impinged upon and (re)directed the trajectory and 
nature of European development.48 Such „extra-European‟ dimensions of feudalism‟s 
development reached far beyond these initial nomadic-sedentary interactions. For not only was 
the feudal system the result of new technologies (notably, the strirrup) diffusing from Asia to 
Europe, but the ideological and normative underpinnings of the system (Christendom) was 
                                                          
45 Perry Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism (London:New Left Books, 1974), 128, 18-19. 
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continually evolving in response to the Ottoman „Islamic threat‟.49 As Hobson notes, 
Christendom was in many respects imagined as „Catholic Christian in contradistinction to the 
Islamic Middle East‟.50 What is more, it was only through the conjunctural combination of the 
Euro-Ottoman conflict with the Euro-Amerindian encounter that Christendom was destroyed as 
the defining normative order, clearing the way for an emergent quasi-secular identity of 
„Europe‟.51 As such, it would be fundamentally mistaken to conceive of feudalism and its crisis as 
solely European developments.52 
 While keeping these intersocietal, extra-European sources of the making of European 
feudalism in mind, we must now return to the original question we set out to address: how did 
feudalism generate such a competitive and war-prone geopolitical system?  
In the absence of the kind of unprecedented economic dynamism afforded by capitalist 
social relations, war was an expedient mode of expanding the surpluses available to the ruling 
classes under feudalism. Feudal relations offered few incentives for either peasant or lord to 
continuously and systematically introduce more productive technological methods, particularly as 
peasants had direct access to their means of production and subsistence.53 Consequently, lordly 
interests lay in extracting more surpluses by directly coercive means. This could be done by 
pushing the peasants to the limit of their subsistence or by seizing the demesnes of other lords. 
The latter course resulted in a process of „political accumulation‟ amongst the lords themselves – 
a war-driven process of state formation.54  
This condition meant that the aristocratic ruling class required the sufficient political, 
ideological, and military means to exploit the peasantry and extract surpluses for lordly 
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consumption.55 However, unlike the tributary empires in Asia, these means were not controlled 
by – or concentrated in – a centralised and unified state, but instead dispersed across the 
nobility.56 The dispersion of coercive capabilities meant that political authority in Europe was 
fragmented, parcellised and therefore also highly competitive, with heightened intra-lordly 
struggle taking place over territories within and outside of feudal „states‟.57 In short, military 
competition and war was more pronounced within Europe than it was within tributary societies 
such as the Ottoman, Mughal and Chinese empires. 
The lords left standing at the end of the process of geopolitical accumulation formed the 
basis for the absolutist state. Representing a „redeployed and recharged apparatus of feudal domination’,58 
the absolutist states system of early modern Europe remained driven by the systemic imperatives 
of geopolitical accumulation explaining the endemic state of warfare marking the epoch. The 
uneven and combined development of feudal-absolutist Europe was thus rooted in this 
territorially-expansionist dynamic of geopolitical accumulation that entailed a deep systemic 
pressure (Trotsky‟s „whip of external necessity‟) for European states to continually innovate upon 
their means of violence. Over time this had the unintended effect of generating military and 
armament industries pioneering distinctly capitalist production relations.59  
Since European powers had a direct interest in the conquest or control of lucrative 
overseas territories for economic and other purposes, this meant that the dynamic of geopolitical 
accumulation spawned significant technological and organization innovations, particularly in the 
military sphere. The reason was due to the relative backwardness of European feudal rules of 
reproduction which, in contrast to the tributary empires in Asia,60 were dependent on wealth 
drawn from merchants and financiers to either fund geopolitical accumulation (in the case of 
Habsburg Spain and Austria) or for reproducing the ruling class itself (as with city-states such as 
Genoa and Venice).61 Because of the fragmented and parcellized character of political power, 
Europeans that wanted to make war required extraordinary financing outside of day-to-day ruling 
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class reproduction. In order to raise armies, European rulers borrowed from international 
banking houses or asked wealthy and powerful sections of society for contributions, either in 
terms of military support or taxes.62 A by-product of European feudal war-making was an 
attendant rise in the political autonomy, power, and influence of merchants, with increasing 
degrees of representation in the decision making structures of states.63 Consequently, the state 
was sensitive to – or at the behest of – merchant interests, wherein state resources, especially 
military, were deployed in order to obtain (and maintain) commercial advantages.  
The key difference between the functioning and sociopolitical position of merchants 
within feudal Europe and the tributary societies in Asia, was then the structural dependence of 
feudal governments on merchants for war-financing and reproduction. This gave merchants a 
relatively stronger position of social and juridical autonomy. In Mughal India, by contrast, state 
managers exhibited an attitude of „indifferent neutrality‟ towards merchants‟ maritime activities.64 
There was very little oppression of merchant activities, but neither was there much support. By 
contrast, European governments often provided merchants with considerable resources and state 
backing, most dramatically exemplified in the Dutch Republic where the VOC represented the 
institutional fusion of political and mercantile interests in which „[c]ompany shareholders and 
members of government, were often one and the same‟.65 As M.N. Perason writes in regards to 
the relationship between states and merchants in Europe vis-à-vis India: „The difference is that in 
Europe guilds were backed up by governments; in India merchant groups were not‟.66  
 The overseas orientation of imperial expansionism partly in pursuit of commercial 
advantages among European states led to a number of significant military innovations, 
particularly in the naval field. Over time, this provided them with a small but decisive competitive 
edge in the means of violence vis-à-vis the primarily land-based tributary empires in Asia, such as 
the Ottomans and Mughals. We may therefore partially agree with Ronald Findlay‟s assessment 
that „it was the long history of naval rivalry in the North Sea and the Atlantic that developed the 
sailing ship as a floating gun platform, a combination of the two technologies‟ that later enabled 
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the Portuguese, Dutch, and British to dominate the Indian Ocean and South Pacific.67 It was 
these latter two burgeoning Dutch and British merchant capitalist empires that came to attain a 
critical military advantage on the seas. „Mediterranean naval techniques and conceptions‟ – where 
the Ottomans were dominant – would prove ineffective in competing with the new, Atlantic-
based sea powers of Holland and England. „The consequent transfer of supremacy at sea to 
northwestern Europe‟, William C. McNeil writes, „had much to do with the general decline of the 
Mediterranean lands that became manifest in the first decades of the seventeenth century… the 
roar of Dutch and English naval guns closed off the last avenue of escape from the economic 
and ecological impasse confronting the Mediterranean populations‟.68  
To reiterate, the point is not to claim that Northewestern European powers were 
somehow cleverer and more resourceful in the arts of naval warfare than the tributary Empires, 
but that there was simply very little systemic incentive or compulsion for the Ottomans, Mughals 
or Chinese to make sustained investments and innovations in naval technologies past a certain 
point. As Findlay points out, „a very significant difference between West and East appears to be 
that long-distance trade was a vital interest to commercial city-states like Venice and Genoa, and 
also to smaller nation-states such as Portugal and later Holland and England, while the Chinese, 
Indian and Middle Eastern states drew their revenue mainly from the taxation of land‟.69 
Moreover, the variegated character of the external threats facing European states 
compared to the tributary empires in Asia, as well as the differential nature of warfare, had 
important effects on the types of military strategies and innovations states‟ focused on. In late 
medieval and early modern Europe, there was little possibility for a single empire or state to 
subdue the entire continent, however much various states tried. This lent itself to a more unstable 
and fluid geopolitical environment where military competition and war were a near-constant 
feature of European life. Consequently, European states were in almost ceaseless conflict with 
one another  forcing each „to adopt quickly any [military] innovation by their rivals‟.70  
One of the primary reasons why geopolitical conflict and war in this period was so 
persistent in Europe was that the feudal ruling classes were themselves under serious threat. Not 
only had the feudal system virtually exhausted all possibilities for further internal expansion, but 
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this also precipitated a sharp fall in seigniorial revenues, itself further exacerbated by the plague-
induced demographic crisis spread from the Mongol expansion into Europe, leading to a 
dramatic rise in peasant revolts and class conflicts more generally.71 This perilous situation was 
continually exacerbated and „overdetermined‟ by the persistent geopolitical-ideological threat 
emanating from the Ottoman Empire.72  
Under such conditions, a near continuous state of war – including both intra-ruling class 
struggles and the incessant efforts to crush peasant rebellions – was a sociological „necessity‟. And 
since European states „did not have the resources of an agrarian empire in cheap manpower‟ they 
were unable „to substitute “quantity for quality”‟.73 By the early modern period, this led to an 
unprecedented dynamism in the military sector which „could maintain productivity growth for 
centuries, a feat virtually unknown elsewhere in pre-industrial economies‟.74 The rapid growth in 
Europe‟s military sectors was perhaps a key reason, along with the development of stronger fiscal 
and organizational capacities,75 for Europe‟s later successes in overseas conquests. In these ways, 
the overall conditions of uneven and combined development emanating from both within and 
without Europe created the propitious „geo-social‟ environment in which specific countries, 
notably the Dutch and English, could emerge and consolidate themselves as capitalist states.76  
Over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Mughal Empire was by contrast 
considerably weakened by the incessant interstate wars in Asia, along with insurgency and piracy 
within their realm and the coast. The Mughals had to contend with both the „conventional threat‟ 
posed by the invading armies of Durrani Empire from Afghanistan and the „unconventional 
warfare launched by the Marathas‟.77 While Britain had by the mid-seventeenth century come to 
attain a slight advantage in fiscal-military capabilities vis-à-vis the Mughal Empire, their ability to 
colonize the Indian landmass was appreciably aided by these external pressures and internal 
divisions ravaging the Empire. The Mughals were particularly vulnerable to a European 
intervention at that time since the various contending regional rulers were unwilling or unable to 
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unite against the Western threat. The British were thereby able to play one ruler against another 
facilitating its capturing of Plassey and other regions (see further Section III).78 
 
Unevenness Combined: North-South Interactions in the ‘Rise of the West’ 
 
These points go some way in turning on its head typical Eurocentric conceptions of the more 
„backward‟ and „stagnant‟ imperial empires of Asia, since it was the less developed nature of 
European feudal societies – their very reproductive weaknesses – that made them more 
susceptible to potential capitalist breakthroughs.79 However, in order to fully subvert Eurocentric 
accounts of the „rise of the West‟, we must move beyond a simple comparative historical 
sociological analysis of the differences between the feudal and tributary systems, and examine 
how their interactive developmental dynamics produced the structural and conjunctural conditions 
enabling European societies‟ transition to capitalism and eventual global ascendency. We see here 
again the operation of uneven development as demonstrated by the „privilege of backwardness‟ 
granted to feudal Europe by the „penalty of progressiveness‟ characterizing the tributary empires 
of Asia. In the geopolitical interactions between feudal and tributary societies, it was the latter 
that presented the „whip of external necessity‟ to the former.  
Indeed, the various state-backed forms of commercial expansion noted above were 
dependent upon the geopolitical conditions generated by Europe‟s constant interaction with non-
European societies. Over the „Long Thirteenth Century‟ (1210-1350), the Pax Mongolica lowered 
commercial protection and transaction costs along Asian overland trade routes providing 
European merchants an opening to take over the pre-existing trade and exchange links of the 
„world-system‟.80 Then, during the sixteenth century, the capitulations given to particular 
European states by the Ottomans and the concomitant economic blockade they imposed upon 
Europe resulted in a structural shift away from the geopolitical and commercial centrality of the 
Mediterranean towards the Atlantic. At the same time, Ottoman military pressure on the 
Habsburg Empire and Papacy acted as a geopolitical „buffer‟, providing the propitious conditions 
(„isolation‟) that enabled the modern state-building activities and processes of primitive 
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accumulation in England.81 Similarly, the „discoveries‟ of the Americas resulted in hugely 
significant effects on trade and production, providing a large injection of bullion into a European 
economy increasingly oriented around the deployment of finance and capital.82 Moreover, the 
emergent forms of territorialised states sovereignty first forged in the Atlantic crucible 
(exemplified by the linearly-defined claims to political authority found in the 1493 Papal Bulls and 
1494 Treaty of Tordesillas between Spain and Portugal) would radiate back to the imperial core in 
Europe forming a crucial step in the formation of the modern territorially-defined states system.83 
These territorial sovereign states were subsequently taken over and reconstituted by the capitalist 
revolutions in Holland, England and France that stretched from the sixteenth to  eighteenth 
centuries.84 Finally, through the colonial activities of merchant companies (specifically, the Dutch 
and English East India Companies) and slave traders, communities across both the Atlantic and 
Indian Ocean littoral were incorporated into an integrated system of exploitation and extraction. 
In these ways, the value appropriated from a globally dispersed mass of labour-power constituted 
a key input for the formation and reproduction of European capital.85 Europe‟s „unique‟ 
developmental trajectory out of feudalism and into capitalism – assisting its rise to global pre-
eminence – was therefore rooted in and conditioned by extra-European determinations and 
agents. It was the combination of these multiple spatio-temporal vectors of development – many of 
which non-European in origin – that explains the so-called European „miracle‟. 
These conditions of uneven and combined development emanating from both within and 
without Europe created a favourable „geo-social‟ environment in which specific countries could 
emerge and consolidate themselves as capitalist states: territorialized sovereign centres of capital 
accumulation.86 As we have seen, the methods and means of „geo-social‟ reproduction in Europe 
and Asia were strikingly different, producing divergent forms and trajectories of geopolitical 
accumulation which, over the course of Europe‟s early modern development, came to interact 
and fuse with the emerging logic of capital accumulation accompanying those states making the 
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transition to capitalism (notably, the Netherlands, England, and later France). These differential 
geo-social conditions and rules of reproduction in Europe and Asia in turn required varied types 
of military capabilities. At the same time, the external threat environments prevailing in the two 
regions were characterized by significant differences lending themselves to different systemic 
incentives and pressures for developing certain military techniques and technologies over others.  
In these ways, ostensibly „sociological‟ and „geopolitical‟ factors interacted and entwined in 
setting certain European states on the path to acquire what would become a decisive comparative 
advantage in the means of violence, fiscal and organizational capacities,87 particularly once these 
factors were buttressed by and harnessed to dynamically capitalist social structures. Moreover, 
Northwestern European states had attained this comparative advantage before 1800 by which 
time they had already „conquered some 35 per cent of the globe‟ whilst controlling „lucrative trade 
routes as far away as Asia‟.88 This, we argue, is what largely explains Europe‟s eventual ascendency 
to global pre-eminence. For, as Geoffrey Parker notes, while the advent of industrialization „helps 
to explain how the Europeans extended their control over the total land area of the globe from 
35 percent in 1800 to 84 percent in 1914, it cannot explain how they managed to acquire that 
initial 35 percent‟. 89 What is more, that initial 35% was in fact crucial for conquering much of the 
other 84%, as exemplified by the Indian case examined below.  
To put all of this in more theoretical terms, we can see how „unevenness‟, in terms of both 
the divergent development between a feudal-cum-capitalist „West‟ and tributary „East‟ and the 
differential forms of their respective geopolitical systems, and „combination‟, operating at the 
level of geopolitical interactions and competition facilitating military and organizational 
innovations, were crucial explanatory factors in the „rise of the West‟. While neo-Weberians‟ are 
correct to single out geopolitical competition as significant, their inability to root this factor in a 
strong conception of social structures – and examine the differential forms and effects of military 
competition – leaves them into the well-worn (neo)realist cul-de-sac of ahistorical reification and 
unit homogenization (the „state-qua-state‟ assumption). By contrast, the theory of U&CD solves 
both these problems: it offers a theoretical explanation of geopolitical competition and its effects 
that remains sensitive to substantive societal differences whilst incorporating a distinctly 
„geopolitical‟ causal component into its conception of development thereby eliding the problem 
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of reification. But to fully understand how „the West‟ came to rule we must first look at the causes 
of the Mughal Empire‟s collapse and its colonization by the British.  
 
The Conjunctural Moment of ‘Overtaking’: Britain’s Colonization of India  
 
The Significance of India’s Colonization to the ‘Rise of the West’ 
  
Britain‟s colonization of India has been underappreciated in „rise of the West‟ debates,90 which 
have largely centred around the origins of industrialization in Europe and, in particular, the 
question of why Britain was first to industrialize. Conceived as such, the prior history of British 
colonization is relegated to a secondary status in explaining the „rise of the West‟, if it is examined 
at all. Yet not only was Mughal India the first of the great tributary empires in Asia to „fall‟ to the 
Europeans, but it also provided the greatest material and strategic benefits of all the colonized 
states. For not only did India offer Britain the material inputs (notably, textiles and cotton) and 
capital crucial to the start of its industrialization drive but, after its colonization, it also provided 
the Empire with a relatively cheap and sizeable military force that assisted the British in forcibly 
opening other markets around the world.  
Thus even the more restrictive question as to the causes of Britain‟s industrialization 
within the debates have been both temporally and spatially misplaced. Temporally so, in the sense that 
in order to explain Britain‟s industrial ascent we must first look at the preceding epoch of British 
colonialism in both the Atlantic and India which, in turn, means that our spatial optic must be 
widened to include an analysis of these extra-European regions‟ contributions to Britain‟s 
industrialization.91 Indeed, the Indian economy was absolutely critical to the „formation and 
consolidation of a UK-centred system of accumulation‟, particularly through India‟s role in 
providing a continual balance-of-payments surplus for the Empire.92 Britain earned huge annual 
surpluses from the Empire‟s transactions with India (and through it, China) that allowed Britain 
to sustain substantial deficits with the US, Germany and its‟ white Dominion states as „the large 
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surplus in the Indian balance of payments became the pivot of the enlarged reproduction of 
Britain‟s world scale processes of capital accumulation and the City‟s mastery of world finance‟.93  
In 1750, India produced approximately 25% of the world‟s manufacturing output. By 
1800, India‟s share had already dropped to less than a fifth, by 1860 to less than a tenth, and by 
1880 to under 3%.94 It is therefore no stretch of the imagination to claim that Britain‟s industrial 
ascent was to a large degree predicated on India‟s forced de-industrialization.95 And, if so, it is 
then no mere coincidence that Britain‟s colonization of India preceded the start of Britain‟s 
industrialization by some twenty years.  
The massive contribution of the British Indian army to Britain‟s overall strategic position 
has also been largely overlooked in debates. The British Indian army numbered approximately 
160,000 in 1900 and later reached a strength of nearly two million persons during the Second 
World War, making a substantial contribution to Britain‟s war efforts of the period.96 According 
to David Washbrook, the British Indian army was of great significance not only to the „rise of the 
West‟, but also in the development of capitalism as a global system, as the Indian contingent 
operated as  
 
the army of British imperialism, formal and informal, which operated worldwide, opening up markets 
to the products of the industrial revolution, subordinating labor forces to the domination of capital 
and bringing to „benighted‟ civilizations the enlightened values of Christianity and 
Rationality…Moreover, because the British Empire was the principal agency through which the world 
system functioned in this era, the Indian army was in a real sense the major coercive force behind the 
internationalization of industrial capitalism.97 
 
Similarly, Geoffrey Parker writes of how  
 
the military resources of India, once under European control, were to prove decisive for the further 
rise of the West. For the Europeans now possessed the means to challenge even their most powerful 
opponents. The Western armies that invaded China in 1839-42, 1859-60, and 1900 all included 
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important Indian contingents… „It was as if the British had subjugated the Indian peninsula simply in 
order to use its resources against China‟.98 
 
An additional underappreciated factor in Britain‟s ascent over Asia resulting from India‟s 
colonization was Britain‟s resourceful appropriation and adaptation of Indian military 
technologies, particularly the Mysorean rocket, that came to play a crucial role in its‟ decimation 
of the Imperial Chinese Navy in 1841. The rocket was first encountered by forces of the East 
India Company at the Battle of Pollilur in 1780, where the British suffered a shattering defeat at 
the hands of the Indian Kingdom of Mysore.99 In an exemplary – if overlooked – case of a 
combined development, the British subsequently took the original Mysorean rocket designs and 
remodelled them with the application of modern engineering techniques at the Woolwich 
Arsenal.  
The resulting Mysorean-cum-Congreve rocket was later deployed against Chinese forces 
with devastating consequences at the Second Battle of Chuenpee (7 January 1841). The case of 
the Mysorean rocket thus represents one of the many „non-endogenous sources of British 
imperial power‟ suggesting that the period between 1780 and 1840 „was critical to Britain‟s “leap-
frogging” over the hitherto more advanced Eurasian polities‟.100 This was a development that 
took place over the course of decades not centuries, as traditionally assumed,101 and was 
fundamentally predicated upon Britain‟s colonization of the Indian subcontinent. In this respect, 
Britain was not an early, but „late-developer‟.102 For these reasons, the causes of the decline of the 
Mughal Empire and its colonization are crucial to the story of Western ascendancy.  
 
The Mughal Empire and the Tributary Mode of Production  
 
The Mughal Empire represented a variant of the tributary mode of production.103 Unlike feudal 
Europe, where lords directly intervened into the production process to coercively extract the 
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surplus from the peasants, in Mughal India a state bureaucracy taxed the peasantry. Throughout 
the Empire, the emperor transferred the rights to land revenue and other taxes within particular 
territorial limits to specific subjects on a temporary basis. These areas were called jāgīrs and the 
assignees known as jāgīrdārs who were predominately mansabdārs; subjects holding ranks (mansabs) 
bestowed to them by the emperor making them high-ranking state officials. The primary 
obligation of the mansabdārs was the maintenance of standing armies and particularly cavalry 
contingents which the emperor could call upon for the imperial army in times of war.104 In their 
assigned jāgīrs, it was the jāgīrdārs who collected land revenues and other taxes from the 
peasantry, who were nominally free, cultivating the land on behalf of the emperor who was 
allotted a set share of such revenues. Over the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, approximately 
half the agricultural product was extracted from the peasantry in the form of this imperial land 
revenue.  
 The jāgīrdārs were then not equivalent to feudal lords exercising direct personal control 
over their subjects. Rather, they approximated more of a „state class‟ dispersed throughout the 
empire by a centralized political apparatus to extract surpluses – as tax or outputs – from a 
peasantry they did not personally control. These two different modalities of surplus-extraction 
thereby entailed very distinct dynamics of social (re-)production: a feudal „coercive rent-taking‟ 
system and a tributary „state tax-raising‟ one.105  
In the feudal mode, the process of exploitation was much more fragmented and 
decentralized. Lords sought to uphold and extend their military and juridical powers necessary to 
control the peasants‟ lives whilst safeguarding a steady stream of revenues. At the same time, a 
much weaker state sought to gain access to income and the means of coercion. By contrast, under 
the tributary mode, the exploiting class‟ interest centred on expanding its tax base and tax 
extracting apparatus, through the use of the state‟s coercive functions.106  
The particularly centralized nature of the tributary state, along with its ability to effectively 
monopolize the means of violence in comparison to the fragmented and parcellized character of 
feudal political relations, made for a more cohesive and unified ruling class.107 Nonetheless, intra-
ruling class tensions still remained. In particular, the potential for conflict between local state 
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officials, private landowners and the centralized imperial state was a central contradiction of 
tributary rules of reproduction. Within the tributary mode, one can discern a tendency for the 
state‟s local agents to develop into feudal-like lords with their own landed estates and armed 
contingents or for wealthy landowners to emerge with significant independent economic and 
political powers.108 Both tendencies could ultimately result in the development of feudalistic 
power relations emerging from tributary mode‟s „laws of motion‟. 
In Mughal India, the imperial state sought to counter the former tendency of state 
officials transforming themselves into feudal-like lords by divorcing the jāgīrdārs, as far as 
possible, from any permanent rights to the land while constantly transferring them to different 
territorial assignments after short periods of time (usually between three or four years).109 While 
this transfer system generally worked in countering any potential for jāgīrdārs to develop into 
feudal lords, in the long term, the system tended to subvert agricultural productivity and growth 
(see below). For the Mughal Empire, then, it appears that the latter tendency of a landed 
aristocracy emerging with considerable independent economic and political powers was the most 
problematic for intra-ruling class relations as demonstrated by the recurring conflicts between the 
zamīndārs (landowners) and imperial authority.  
The zamīndārs were a distinct class of potentates with varying claims to the shares in the 
produce of land and/or part of the land revenue. They shared a number of common attributes: 
their rights to the land did not (with some exceptions) originate from imperial grants; command 
over armed retainers was usually a complement of this right; and they were frequently leaders of a 
caste group. The key point of potential conflict between the imperial authorities and the zamīndārs 
was, then, the size of the latter‟s share in the land revenue or surplus produce. „The struggle 
between the imperial administration and the zamīndārs, breaking out frequently into armed 
conflict‟, Irfan Habib writes, „was thus an important feature of the political situation‟.110  
The most significant of these armed conflicts between the zamīndārs and the imperial 
authorities was the zamīndār-led Maratha Revolt of the late seventeenth century.111 As a result of 
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the Maratha Revolt, there emerged a distinct class of feudal-like lords, now separate and 
autonomous from the Mughals, wielding significant powers over their subjects in occupied lands. 
„Unlike the Mughal jāgīrdārs’, Fukazawa writes, „the big assignees in the Deccan Muslim kingdoms 
exercised wide administrative powers in their assigned territories, which tended to become 
hereditary, unchecked by the central authority‟.112 This was a case wherein certain features 
characteristic of one mode of production (feudalism) emerged from and combined with the existing 
dominant mode of production (tributary). In this sense, the Mughal Empire of the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries represented a kind of organic mode of sociological 
combination whereby two differentiated modes of production co-existed and causally interacted 
in contradictory and crisis-prone ways.113  
The importance of the rise of the Marathas challenging the Mughal Empire cannot be 
overstated as it „constituted the greatest single force responsible for the downfall of the Mughal 
Empire‟.114 The Mughal wars in the Deccan (1681-1707) against the Marathas were a major drain 
on imperial institutions and resources eventually destabilizing Mughal rule throughout its 
territories.115 As the imperial demand for revenue increased, so too did the exploitative pressures 
on the peasantry as the wars drew key resources out of the agricultural economy whilst leading to 
considerable destruction of existing capital.116 To understand how this translated into widespread 
peasant unrest and flight, we must first examine the contradictions of the jāgīr system in a bit 
more detail.  
 
The Imperial Revenue System and Agricultural Decline in the Mughal Empire 
 
The land revenue system created by the Mughal Empire was perhaps unequalled by any of its 
contemporaries. It far surpassed the revenue structures in Europe in both its scale of operation 
(i.e., the total land area, population, and resources controlled) and its organizational sophistication 
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and cohesion (i.e., the use of paid officials and formal administrative mechanisms). In contrast to 
the French kings of the ancien régime, for example, the Mughal imperial authorities did not 
generally have to resort to private capital, short-term loans and intermediary financiers to fund 
their war efforts except in the case of the wars against the Marathas.117 Nonetheless, despite its 
organizational scale and sophistication, the revenue system would over time develop a number of 
problems that came to hinder the overall functioning of the Mughal economy: particularly, the 
tendency to over-exploit the peasantry.  
Since the time of Akbar (1568), a practice was established whereby jāgīrdārs, who held no 
permanent rights to the land, were transferred to new territorial assignments every three to four 
years. This kept in check any tendency for them to develop into feudal-like lords. However, it also 
had a number of unintentional negative consequences, increasing over time, for the agrarian 
economy. For as the jāgīrdārs were being continually transferred to different territorial assignment 
every few years, their short-term interest was not necessarily in increasing or even maintaining 
agricultural growth and productivity, but rather in maximizing the exploitation of the peasantry in 
their assigned territorial domain thereby subverting the long-term objectives of the imperial 
authority. As Habib explains,  
 
…there was an element of contradiction between interests of the imperial administration and the 
individual jāgīrdārs. A jāgīrdār, whose assignment was liable to be transferred any moment and who 
never held the same jāgīr for more than three of four years at the most, could have no interest in 
following a far-sighted policy of agricultural development… his personal interest would sanction any 
act of oppression that conferred an immediate benefit upon him, even if it ruined the peasantry and so 
destroyed the revenue-paying capacity of that area for a long time.118 
 
Inherent to the Mughal revenue system was then a tendency towards the absolute „maximization 
of exploitation‟ to the point of destabilizing the entire agrarian economy.119 Moreover, as military 
contingents were maintained by the mansabdārs out of the revenues of the jāgīrs, the imperial 
authorities tended to set revenue demand at a high enough level to secure the greatest amount of 
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military strength for the Empire. However, if the revenue rate was set too high, it would leave the 
peasant without enough subsistence to survive. Consequently, revenue collection could soon fall 
in absolute terms.120  
Yet, with the costly wars with the Marathas straining imperial revenues in the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, increased revenue demands came to press harder still 
on the lower peasantry. For unlike earlier periods when the Mughal Empire had expanded into 
wealthy regions, thereby making up the costs of their conquests, the Deccan campaigns were a 
very different story. There, Mughal military expenditures consistently outpaced revenues and 
office-holders saw their incomes decline. The Mughal state thus sought to step up its „revenue 
demands which in turn stirred up resentment in large parts of the empire that, when coupled with 
religious and political rivalries, manifested itself in the emergence of popular movements such as 
the Sikhs in the Punjab or the Marathas in Central India‟.121  
State revenue demand had in fact more than doubled between the eras of Akbar (1556-
1605) and Aurangzeb (1658-1707).122 Moreover, as centralized Mughal authority began to crack 
under the continuing geopolitical pressures from the Marathas, the state increasingly resorted to 
tax-farming which became ever more widespread within its successor states.123 This had the effect 
of raising the effective rent share of the state to 50% or higher, greater than the 40% that the 
Mughals had previously extracted.124 The massive fiscal pressure that the Mughal state brought to 
bear on the peasantry in turn led to increasing indebtedness in the villages, causing peasant flight 
and rebellions. „As oppression increased, the number of absconding peasants grew, cultivation 
declined and peasants took to arms giving birth to rural uprisings of varying intensity. 
Consequently the empire fell prey to the wrath of an impoverished peasantry‟.125 The result was a 
generalized „agricultural crisis‟ manifesting itself throughout the Mughal Empire by the late 
seventeenth century for which the jāgīr system, and its associated high taxation, land desertion and 
peasant unrest, coupled with the increasing costs of war, was primarily to blame.126 
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Indeed, peasant unrest and rebellion were generally increasing during this period 
politically destabilizing many Mughal territories.127 At the same time, the political fragmentation 
and warfare accompanying the Marathas Revolt further acted to disrupt India‟s major internal 
trade routes, increasing transportation costs and insurance rates.128 As such, Satish Chandra notes, 
„[t]he available social surplus [in the Empire] was insufficient to defray the cost of administration, 
pay for wars of one type or another, and to give the ruling class a standard of living in keeping 
with its expectations‟.129 Curiously enough, Washbrook suggests that the very vibrancy and strong 
economic growth of the Mughal Empire over the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries may 
have been a cause of its later troubles as „economic growth started to nurture the political 
ambitions, and the regional and “community” forces, which eventually undermined it‟. Here we 
find another expression of the „penalties of progressiveness‟, resulting from overall uneven and 
combined character of development, besetting the Indian economy.130 
 
European Trade and Colonial Conquest: Towards the Battle of Plassey 
 
There were, moreover, a number of distinctly international factors further exacerbating the Mughal 
Empire‟s economic woes during this period. For over the course of the seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries, the world economic and geopolitical environment in which the Mughal 
Empire was embedded was dramatically transformed as the Portuguese, Dutch, English, and later 
French, made their excursions into the Indian Ocean. Firstly, the Mugha-Maratha Wars (1680-
1707) were themselves „overdetermined‟ by an array of uneven causal chains generated by a 
geopolitical environment fundamentally transformed by the entry of the Europeans. Occupying 
key coastal areas in the commercial shipping lanes of the Indian Ocean, the Marathas experienced 
extensive geopolitical contacts with Europeans from the sixteenth century onwards. This was a 
relation of „contained warfare‟ with belligerence and collaboration employed in near equal 
measure. On the one hand, the Marathas developed a powerful naval force that was able to repel 
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European ships if and when they so desired.131 On land, a large and sophisticated network of 
fortresses formed the backbone of Maratha military might.132 Both land and sea capabilities were 
often mobilised in response to European penetration into the region. On the other hand, the 
Marathas sought to reap the „privileges of backwardness‟ in any areas in which Europeans held a 
comparative advantage – namely, the use of firearms and modern military strategy.  
From the Portuguese and French came the main supplies of firearms – gunpowder, 
cannon balls, and lead were all purchased and entered use in the Maratha army.133 Such was the 
integration of the Euro-Maratha military-commercial complex that the Marathas allowed the 
French to build a factory at Rajapore in 1679 and „employed Portuguese agents to purchase 
artillery from them‟.134 But the integration of Europeans extended beyond exchange in military 
goods.  
As early as 1692, the French Governor Martine was providing tactical assistance to the 
Marathas at the time of their war with the Mughals.135 A number of European adventurers of 
Portuguese, French, Dutch and English origin, were employed as mercenaries and commanders, 
responsible for training and organising armies and assisting Maratha chiefs in battles. The 
expansion of European trained battalions and the purchase of European expertise and weaponry 
proved costly incentivising processes of geopolitical accumulation.136 The Maratha confrontation 
with the Mughals was arguably a direct – if partial – outcome of the need to finance the 
hybridisation of Euro-Maratha military operations. This military combination proved remarkably 
efficient and, up to that point, historically exceptional in challenging the hitherto preponderant 
Mughal Empire.  
 Meanwhile, the increasing Dutch and English penetration into Asian markets over the 
course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries caused serious disturbances in the Mughal 
economy and intensified the financial difficulties of the ruling classes. As the costs of luxury 
goods consumed by the ruling classes increased with their diversion from their „traditional‟ 
                                                          
131 The Marathan admiral Kanhoji Angre famously never lost a battle to Europeans during his 58-year career. See T. 
R. Raghavan, “Admiral Kanhoji Angre”, in K.K.N. Kurup, ed., India’s Naval Traditions: The Role of the Kunhali 
Marakkars (New Delhi:Northern Book Centre, 1997), 72-78 
132 Ram Krishna Tandon, “European Adventurers and Changes in the Indian Military System”, in Hans Hagerdal, 
ed., Responding to the West: Essays on Colonial Domination and Asian Agency (Amsterdam:Amsterdam University Press, 
2009), 29-43, 33. 
133 S.N. Sen, The Military System of the Marathas (Calcutta:Orient Longman, 1958), 85. 
134 Tandon, “European Adventurers”, 37. 
135 V.G. Hatalkar, Relations between the French and the Marathas (1668-1815) (Bombay:University of Bombay, 1958). 
136 Tandon, “European Adventurers”, 41. 
This is the accepted version of Anievas, Alexander and Nişancioğlu ‘How Did the West Usurp the Rest? Origins of the 
Great Divergence over the Longue Durée’ Comparative Studies in Society and History Vol. 59 (1), 34-67. Published 
version available from Cambridge University Press at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417516000608  
Accepted Version downloaded from: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24382/  
  
markets with the Europeans, this meant that revenue demands had to also be increased. 
Consequently, the Indian ruling class‟s „income previously obtained no longer sufficed. Here was 
a factor for an attempt at greater agrarian exploitation; and when that failed, or proved counter-
productive, for reckless factional activities for individual gain, leading to interminable civil 
wars‟.137  
The economic difficulties of the Mughal Empire seem to have been quite widespread. 
K.N. Chaudhuri observes, for example, that „the 1730s were a bad time for southern India‟ and 
that „the great Anglo-French wars of the mid-eighteenth century further dislocated trade that was 
already in serious difficulties‟.138 Around the same time in Jugdia, the most important Bengali 
cotton producing region, matters were „coming to a crisis in the production sphere‟. By the 
middle of the eighteenth century, there were already „some signs of deindustrialization‟ under the 
impact of strong foreign economic competition and weaker local mercantile organizations.139  
More generally, Indian merchant groups throughout the Empire suffered from the 
presence of European traders, with „most indigenous traders‟ in key exporting regions assuming 
„a position subordinate to the servants of the East India companies‟.140 Furthermore, under the 
competitive pressures of European trade, the early eighteenth century witnessed the collapse of 
one of the Empire‟s hitherto greatest commercial marines in Gujarat, „arguably the most 
important developments in the trade of the Indian Ocean during the period‟.141 Similarly, the 
substantial commerce of the Coromandel Coast was dramatically hindered by the intrusion of 
Dutch merchants over the seventeenth century, which, as Arasaratnam tells us, „cut deep into the 
trade that had been traditionally carried out in the region‟ interrupting the „the ancient links 
between Coromandel and Southeast Asia which had been, in many ways, the lifeline of 
Coromandel‟s commerce‟. As Arasaratnam goes on: 
 
It was this commercial artery that was punctured violently in the course of the 17th century…. In a 
series of military and naval actions, these ports and markets were shut off from competitive trading. It 
meant the denial of a lucrative export trade in spices to Coromandel. And it meant the denial of 
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minerals – gold and tin – which had formed a profitable import to India. It must be emphasized that 
all these were achieved by brute force and not by superior commercial expertise.142  
 
Crucial to note, it was not the „superior commercial expertise‟ of the Dutch merchants that made 
them so competitive and disruptive, but rather their comparative advantage in the means of violence, 
and, particularly, their naval superiority. 
Indeed, both the Dutch and English had attained a position of relative naval superiority 
over the Mughal Empire by the late seventeenth century.143 Given their continuing inability to 
outcompete Indian merchants on the open market, the Dutch and English continually utilized 
the use or threat of violence to back up their commercial activities. In the end, this superiority in 
the means of violence would prove crucial in the final fall of the Mughal Empire to the British 
dramatized by the Battle of Plassey in Bengal of 23 June 1757.  
The immediate motivations behind Major-General Robert Clive‟s coup of 1757 seem to 
have arisen from Britain‟s increasing preoccupation with intensified French competition and a 
desire to protect British trading interests in Bengal against the perceived depredations of local 
rulers.144 In this respect, the competitive pressures of European capitalist states, transmitted both 
economically and geopolitically, „overdetermined‟ and redirected the pattern and dynamics of 
India‟s development. Again we see how the uneven and combined nature of India‟s development in 
relation to the European powers came to play a causally decisive role in the Mughal Empire‟s 
collapse. The contemporaneous existence of a multiplicity of societies, all exhibiting varying 
forms of development (unevenness), came to causally interact (geopolitical combination) in ways 
that produced further axes and layers of sociologically differentiated patterns of development 
(sociological combinations) in turn leading to sharp divergences in their own developmental 
trajectories.   
It is important to reiterate, however, that the Mughal Empire was already suffering from 
innumerable economic and political difficulties, stemming in part from the competitive pressures 
European traders had already brought to bear on the Empire during the preceding century, well 
before the time of Britain‟s formal colonization of the country over the second half of the 
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eighteenth century.145 As noted, divisions among local regional rulers mitigated their ability and 
wiliness to join military forces in thwarting European incursions.146 Consequently, the British 
were able to pit one ruler against another in their conquering efforts.147 Indeed, at the Battle of 
Plassey, „Clive‟s success owed much to divisions among the Nawab‟s army‟.148 Meanwhile, the 
British were further assisted in the process of conquest by various indigenous merchant and 
financial groups whose political and economic power had been steadily growing since the late 
seventeenth century as centralized state power began to breakdown.149 In this rather perverse 
sense, „Eastern agency‟ was a significant part in how the British succeeded in their colonization 
efforts. 
With the capture of Bengal, probably the wealthiest province of Mughal India, the East 
India Company and its servants achieved an enormous advantage in dealing with all states and 
economies in the subcontinent thereby further aiding subsequent British conquests as they came 
to bring the entirety of the Mughal Empire under their dominion.150 And with the colonization of 
the entire Indian landmass completed by the early nineteenth century, the British state accrued 
significant strategic and material advantages in further expanding and buttressing its bourgeoning 
global empire as it sought to open all the markets of the world to its industrial products. In these 
ways, the „decline of the East‟ and the „rise of the West‟ were mutually conditioning and co-constitutive 




If we were to choose a single symbolic moment of the beginning of the West‟s systemic 
„overtaking‟ of the „East‟ in its rise to global dominance, the years between the British taking of 
Bengal in 1757 and the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1763 would likely suffice. For it was 
during these seven world-transforming years that the first of the great tributary empires in the 
Asia fell at the hands of the Europeans, while the final external systemic threat to the 
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development of British (and thus world) capitalism, the French monarchy, was extinguished in a 
string of spectacular military victories.  
After the defeat of France and Spain in this conflict, Britain would acquire dominion over 
a large portion of three continents under the terms of the 1763 Treaty. This also meant that the 
white settlers in North America would no longer need protection from British forces.151 The 
decisive defeat of the French in 1759 both paved the way for the establishment of the Raj in India 
and made the emergence of North America possible. Thus, Frank McLynn is correct to claim that 
this was the year that marked the beginning of Britain‟s (and subsequently Europe‟s) dominance 
of the world as the „entire history of the world would have been different but for the events of 
1759. If the French had prevailed in North America, there would have been no United States (at 
least in the form we know it)‟ and if „France had won in India, the global hegemony of the 
English language could never have happened.152 In short, McLynn concludes, „[t]he consequences 
of 1759 really were momentous; it really was a hinge on which all of world history turned‟.153  
While anti-capitalist and colonial struggles would continually and forcefully challenge 
capitalism‟s global hegemony, the capitalist world system was by this time now firmly entrenched 
and resting on solid (geo)political foundations (notably, the British Empire). From the second 
half of the eighteenth century to the early twentieth century, the world witnessed the steady 
growth and domination of capitalist social relations (spread by force or otherwise). In the process, 
the Global South came to be subjugated in a tangled web of economic, (geo)political and racial 
hierarchies with the Europeans and subsequently United States sitting at the top. The rich and 
powerful states grew richer and more powerful on the backs of the weak and impoverished. The 
process of Western domination culminated in the imposition of unequal trade treaties on China 
and Japan in the mid and late nineteenth century. Nearly a century later, the sublime dictatorship 
of capital over the world was largely completed.  
In this article, we have argued that the „rise of the West‟ was the composite outcome of 
multiple – uneven – processes of historical development that were international in their origins 
and scale. In so doing, we have moved away from self-aggrandizing Eurocentric narratives which 
locate European supremacy exclusively in the peculiar, internal characteristics of Europe itself. 
This was demonstrated through an analysis of the breakdown of European feudalism – a process 
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that is inexplicable without taking into consideration non-European agency. We have also moved 
beyond those revisionist accounts that explain away the „rise of the West‟ through recourse to 
contingency – the claim that Europe rose to prominence because of luck, chance and accident.  
When reassessed from the vantage point of U&CD, we demonstrated that the 
homogenised conception of global history – a global history expunged of substantive 
sociohistorical difference – that the revisionists hold breaks down upon closer scrutiny. By 
reintroducing the multilinear and interactive dimension of development as our basic premise, we 
argued that the „rise of the West‟ is best understood as the interconnected outcome of structural 
and contingent historical processes that were in each instance overdetermined by intersocietal 
interactions. In making this argument, we do not claim the final word on debates around the „rise 
of the West‟, but rather hope to introduce U&CD as a framework through which this debate can 
be assessed anew. In this respect, we hope that revisionist, internationalist approaches might be 
advanced and strengthened against the increasingly untenable assumptions of Eurocentrism that 
have hitherto plagued our understanding of how „the West‟ came to rule.  
